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Rethinking Economics for a New 
Era of Financial Regulation:   
The Political Economy of  
Hyman Minsky 
Charles J. Whalen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Many policymakers and most of the economics profession 
failed to anticipate the recent global financial crisis and the 
subsequent Great Recession—the most severe downturn since 
the Great Depression.  Even worse, many economists did not 
think such a crisis was possible.  “[T]hey positively denied that it 
would happen,” says finance professor Franklin Allen of the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.1 
In the wake of that crisis, policymakers and economists have 
begun to take a fresh look at the financial system.  Policymakers, 
for example, enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), signaling a new 
era of U.S. financial regulation.2  That legislation seeks to 
strengthen and extend financial-system rules and oversight, not 
only to protect investors and consumers from deceptive and 
abusive practices, but also to reduce systemic risks that could 
threaten the economy.3  Meanwhile, economists and financial 
analysts have rediscovered the ideas of the late Hyman P. 
Minsky (1919–1996), a monetary economist who devoted his 
 
* Principal Analyst, Macroeconomic Analysis Division, U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO).  The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and should not 
be interpreted as those of the CBO.  The initial draft of this Article was prepared shortly 
after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act—before the author began working at CBO—and the 
final version was submitted for publication in January 2011.  This Article draws from and 
expands upon the author’s previously published chapter entitled: A Minsky Perspective on 
the Global Recession of 2009, in MINSKY, CRISIS AND DEVELOPMENT 106 (Daniela Tavasci 
& Jan Toporowski eds., 2010). 
 1 Why Economists Failed to Predict the Financial Crisis, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON 
(May 13, 2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234. 
 2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 3 Id. 
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career to the study of financial instability.4  In fact, Nobel 
Laureate Paul Krugman presented a mid-2009 lecture at the 
London School of Economics entitled “The Night They Re-Read 
Minsky.”5 
This Article takes the ongoing rediscovery of Minsky as its 
point of departure and presents his ideas in the context of the 
recent crisis.  It explains that Minsky’s views provide a way of 
rethinking economics that fits with the new era of financial 
regulation.  Minsky focused on three features of economic life: the 
cyclical nature of advanced capitalist economies, the reality of 
incessant institutional innovation, and the role of public policy in 
fostering and sustaining economic prosperity.6  Each feature 
draws inspiration from the scholarship of earlier economists,7 
and each remains relevant to understanding today’s economy and 
the economic challenges likely to confront policymakers, 
economists, and the general public in the years to come. 
I.  THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF ADVANCED CAPITALIST ECONOMIES 
Like many of the economists who earned a Ph.D. at Harvard 
in the early 1950s, Minsky drew inspiration from the economics 
of John Maynard Keynes.8  Unlike most of his classmates, 
however, Minsky was interested in the conception of economic 
life underlying Keynes’s analysis, not merely in Keynes’s policy 
recommendations for coping with severe business downturns.  As 
Minsky explains in his 1975 book, John Maynard Keynes, the 
economics of Keynes derives from a business cycle perspective of 
the economy: the subject matter is “a sophisticated capitalist 
economy, whose past and whose future entail business cycles.”9 
 
 4 Minsky taught at the University of California at Berkeley and Washington 
University before taking up residence at the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College in 
the last decade of his life.  For evidence of the recent rediscovery of Minsky, see, e.g. 
Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
18, 2007, at A1; Janet L. Yellen, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., 
President’s Speech to the 18th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the 
U.S. and World Economies: A Minsky Meltdown, Lessons for Central Bankers 
(Apr. 16, 2009). 
 5 Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics III: The Night They Re-Read 
Minsky, L.S.E. CENTRE FOR ECON. PERFORMANCE (June 10, 2009), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/ 
_new/interviews/default.asp. 
 6 See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 10 (1986). 
 7 See id. at 8–10 & nn.7–9. 
 8 Hyman P. Minsky, in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS 
352, 353–55 (Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer eds., 1992) [hereinafter Minsky, in A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS]. 
 9 HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 58 (1975) [hereinafter MINSKY, JOHN 
MAYNARD KEYNES]. 
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The political economy of Minsky builds on Keynes’ business 
cycle perspective.10  Indeed, Minsky’s analyses are rooted in the 
notion that economic expansions and contractions are an 
inherent part of advanced capitalist economies.11  In John 
Maynard Keynes, Minsky defines such economies as 
characterized by expensive and long-lived capital goods as well as 
by short-term financing and financial markets (the New York 
Stock Exchange, for example).12  These are the economies for 
which Minsky develops what he calls the “financial instability 
hypothesis” (FIH).13 
The FIH can be seen as an alternative to the “efficient 
market hypothesis” that was popular in academic circles before 
the recent financial crisis.14  According to the efficient market 
perspective, investors, lenders, and other financial-market 
participants are not, as a group, predisposed to overconfidence or 
other biases.15  In contrast, the FIH treats panics and 
overconfidence—what some have called “irrational exuberance”—
as regular features of the economic landscape.16 
Behind both the conventional economics of Keynes’ time and 
the modern efficient market hypothesis is an assumption that the 
future can be treated as a matter involving risk in the 
probabilistic sense.17  In other words, the assumption suggests 
that outcomes can be anticipated (and therefore managed) by a 
calculation of probabilities.  Keynes, however, dismissed that 
notion.  He argued instead that the economic future most often 
involves uncertainty, for which no assignment of probabilities is 
possible.18  For example, Keynes wrote: 
The whole object of the accumulation of Wealth is to produce results, 
or potential results, at a comparatively distant, and sometimes at an 
indefinitely distant, date.  Thus the fact that our knowledge of the 
future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders Wealth a 
peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of classical economic 
theory.  This theory might work very well in a world in which 
 
 10 Id. at 56–57. 
 11 Id. at 57. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Minsky, in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS, supra 
note 8, at 355. 
 14 CHARLES J. WHALEN, LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLLEGE, THE U.S. CREDIT 
CRUNCH OF 2007: A MINSKY MOMENT 12 (2009) [hereinafter WHALEN, THE U.S. CREDIT 
CRUNCH OF 2007]. 
 15 HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR 5 (2002). 
 16 ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2d ed. 2005). 
 17 Paul Davidson, Risk and Uncertainty in Economics 3–7 (Feb. 6, 2009) (paper 
presented at the conference on “The Economic Recession and the State of Economics”). 
 18 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 51 Q. J. ECON. 209, 
213–14 (1937). 
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economic goods were necessarily consumed within a short interval of 
their being produced.  But it requires, I suggest, considerable 
amendment if it is to be applied to a world in which the accumulation 
of wealth for an indefinitely postponed future is an important factor; 
and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealth-
accumulation the more essential does such amendment become.19 
In short, wealth accumulation in an advanced capitalist economy 
involves uncertainty rather than risk. 
In a world of uncertainty, Keynes argued that the 
expectations of borrowers and lenders rest on conventions and 
rules of thumb that are used to assess the hazards accompanying 
economic decisions.20  Minsky followed Keynes’ lead.  Minsky 
stressed not only that reliance on conventions causes market 
participants to engage in herd behavior, but also that such 
reliance is a “flimsy foundation” for economic decisions.21  Thus, 
the FIH sees an economy in which expectations are prone to 
sudden and substantial change.22 
According to Minsky’s FIH, the financial structure of our 
economy becomes more and more fragile over a period of 
prosperity.23  In the early stages of an economic expansion, 
enterprises in “highly profitable segments of the economy are 
rewarded for taking on increasing amounts of debt. . . .  [T]heir 
success encourages other firms to engage in similar behavior.”24  
Eventually, a number of enterprises—sometimes even many 
households—begin to pile up so much debt that they require 
refinancing merely to make interest payments.25 
That pattern of refinancing was certainly evident in the 
high-tech sector during the late-1990s and in the housing sector 
during the early- and mid-2000s.26  Indeed, construction 
companies and contractors were not the only ones taking on more 
 
 19 Id. at 213. 
 20 Id. at 213–14. 
 21 Id. at 214–15.  See also MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, supra note 9, at 91. 
 22 Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, supra note 18, at 214–15. 
 23 Charles J. Whalen, A Minsky Perspective on the Global Recession of 2009 3 
(Research on Money & Fin., Discussion Paper No. 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.researchonmoneyandfinance.org/media/papers/RMF-12-Whalen.pdf 
[hereinafter Whalen, Global Recession]. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Minsky calls this extraordinary state of affairs “Ponzi finance” because such a 
situation often recalls the pyramid schemes of infamous financial swindler, Charles Ponzi. 
Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis 6 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working 
Paper No. 74, 1992), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf; Ponzi 
Schemes—Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2011). 
 26 Whalen, Global Recession, supra note 23, at 3.  See also Kai Tian, What’s the Risk 
with Interest Only Mortgage?, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?Whats-the-Risk-
With-Interest-Only-Mortgage?&id=3817044 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). 
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debt at the start of the new millennium.27  Homebuyers also 
accumulated a growing amount of debt “as the housing market 
began heating up, in part because interest rates were low and the 
stock market had become less attractive in the wake of the dot-
com boom and bust.”28  While it had long been customary for U.S. 
homebuyers to make a twenty percent down payment on a home, 
in the last decade, forty-two percent of first-time homebuyers and 
thirteen percent of non-first-time homebuyers put no money 
down to acquire homes.29 
In retrospect, of course, enterprises and homebuyers should 
have resisted the impulse toward increasing indebtedness, but 
the incentives at the time were just too great.  As economists 
Gary Dymski and Robert Pollin explained in a 1992 essay, 
nobody in a robust sector of the economy wants to be left behind 
due to underinvestment: 
Even if market participants did have full knowledge of the Minsky 
model, and were therefore aware that financial crises will occur at 
some point, that still would not enable them to predict when the 
financial crisis will occur.  In the meantime, aggressive firm managers 
and bank loan officers will be rewarded for pursuing profitable 
opportunities and gaining competitive advantages.  Cautious 
managers, operating from the understanding that boom conditions 
will end at some uncertain point, will be penalized when their more 
aggressive competitors surpass their short-­‐run performance.30 
As the preceding quote indicates, lenders, as well as 
borrowers, fuel the tendency toward greater indebtedness during 
an expansion.  The same climate of expectations that encourages 
borrowers to acquire more risky financial liability structures also 
eases lenders’ worries that new loans might go unpaid.31  
Moreover, it is not just that borrowing and lending expand in the 
boom.  There is also financial innovation (which will be given 
further attention in the next section).  In fact, in a 1992 essay, 
Minsky wrote that bankers and other financial intermediaries 
are “merchants of debt who strive to innovate in the assets they 
acquire and the liabilities they market.”32 
 
 27 Whalen, Global Recession, supra note 23, at 3. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Gloria Irwin, No Money Down Gains More Buyers, AKRON BEACON J. 
(July 31, 2005), http://www.policymattersohio.org/media/ABJ_No_money_down_gains_ 
more_buyers_2005_0731.htm. 
 30 Gary Dymski & Robert Pollin, Hyman Minsky as Hedgehog: The Power of the Wall 
Street Paradigm 36 (Univ. of Cal. Riverside, Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 92-24, 
1990). 
 31 Whalen, Global Recession, supra note 23, at 3. 
 32 Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, supra note 25, at 6. 
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A boom cannot continue forever, however.  We eventually 
arrive at what some have called the “Minsky moment.”33  In other 
words, it eventually becomes clear that some borrowers have 
become overextended and need to sell assets (or, if possible, 
secure a government bailout) to make their loan payments.  In 
the recent crisis, early high-profile cases involved the mortgage 
broker Countrywide, the British bank Northern Rock, and two 
hedge funds run by Bear Stearns (which itself became a casualty 
of the crisis some months later).34 
Then the problem spreads.  Since bankers and investors hold 
subjective expectations about acceptable debt levels, once a 
shortfall of cash and a forced selling of assets materializes 
somewhere in the economy, it can lead to widespread 
reassessment of how much debt or lending is appropriate.35  
Moreover, the buildup can go on for years, but when anything 
goes wrong the revaluation can be sudden.36 
When banks decide to rein in their lending, we find ourselves 
in a credit crunch.  It is easy to think of the recent economic 
crisis as something that began with the worldwide stock-market 
downturn in the autumn of 2008.37  In fact, though, the 
difficulties of 2008 were preceded by a credit crunch that began 
in the summer of 2007, and signs of trouble—traceable in large 
part to the subprime mortgage market—were evident as early as 
March 2007.38 
Once a credit crunch emerges, financial difficulties are no 
longer confined to one sector.39  In fact, a crunch threatens not 
only business investment, but also household spending (which 
depends in large part on credit conditions as well as on 
employment generated by businesses).40  This means that when a 
sectoral bubble bursts—as in the high-tech sector a decade ago or 
in the housing sector more recently—the collapse threatens to 
trigger an economy-wide recession.41  That sort of slump is what 
the United States and much of the world experienced recently. 
As the recent crisis demonstrated, a “Minsky moment” can 
quickly transform into an economic “meltdown.”  In the United 
States, that meltdown revealed itself in at least three sectors: 
 
 33 Lahart, supra note 4. 
 34 WHALEN, THE U.S. CREDIT CRUNCH OF 2007, supra note 14, at 9, 19–20. 
 35 Whalen, Global Recession, supra note 23, at 3. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 WHALEN, THE U.S. CREDIT CRUNCH OF 2007, supra note 14, at 8. 
 39 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 389 (2011). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 390. 
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housing, banking, and the stock market.42  House prices, on 
average, fell by more than ten percent between the beginning of 
the second quarter of 2006 and the end of 2007, when the recent 
recession began (as determined by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research).43  House prices plummeted by another 
twenty-two percent during the recession—wiping out a total of 
nearly $6 trillion from the net value of real estate held by 
households—and have still not recovered as of this writing 
(January 2011).44  In addition, the recent housing downturn has 
been accompanied by record levels of “underwater” mortgages 
(when a family owes more on their mortgage than their home is 
worth) and mortgage defaults.45 
The meltdown in banking slowed considerably after 
enactment of the federal government’s Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) in 2008, but the damage has still been 
substantial in the financial industry.46  Over 300 financial 
institutions failed since the beginning of 2007.47  And, “as of the 
third quarter of 2010 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) identified 860 ‘problem’ banks,” the highest number since 
the savings and loan crisis nearly two decades ago.48 
The stock market has been recovering since mid-2009, but 
the initial market decline was stunning, and the loss of 
household net worth from falling equity prices was even greater 
than the loss from falling house prices.49  The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, for example, fell thirty-seven percent 
between March 30, 2007 and April 1, 2009.50  In fact, “[t]he total 
value of corporate equities held by households directly or 
indirectly (through pensions, life insurance companies, 
government retirement programs, or mutual funds) fell by almost 
 
 42 U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 
2011 TO 2021 32–34 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12039/01-
26_FY2011Outlook.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK]; Determination of 
the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH 1, http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.pdf (last updated Dec. 11, 2008). 
 43 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 32. 
 44 Id. at 33. 
 45 John Gittelsohn, Home-Price Drop Leaves 27% of U.S. Homeowners Underwater 
on Loans, Zillow Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
print/2011-02-09/home-price-decline-leaves-27-of-u-s-owners-underwater-on-loans.html. 
 46 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: ASSESSING THE TARP 
ON THE EVE OF ITS EXPIRATION 3 (2010), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
091610-report.pdf. 
 47 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 34. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 33. 
 50 Dow Jones Industrial Average Values from March 30, 2007 to April 1, 2009, 
YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com (follow “Dow” hyperlink;; then follow 
“Historical Prices” hyperlink;; then search “Mar. 30, 2007” for “Start Date” and search 
“Apr. 1, 2009” for “End Date”). 
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$8 trillion during the recession.”51  As of the third quarter of 
2010, households’ equity holdings had only regained about 
$4 trillion—half of what they had lost.52 
Looking beyond housing, banking, and equities, one also 
finds a troubled U.S. labor market.  The nation’s unemployment 
rate rose from 4.4% in March 2007 to 10.1% in October 2009 
(approaching its post-World War II peak of 10.8%), and in 2010 
the jobless rate averaged 9.6%.53  That rate would have been 
higher, but many job seekers became discouraged after failing to 
find work, leaving the labor force, and were thus excluded from 
the official unemployment count.54 
Moreover, rates of long-term unemployment observed in 
2010 were unprecedented in the post-World War II era.  For 
example, on average, forty-three percent of workers who were 
unemployed in 2010 were out of work for more than twenty-six 
weeks.55  Many economic forecasters expect that it will take a few 
more years for the unemployment rate to return to less than six 
percent.56 
According to Minsky’s FIH, a downturn will eventually give 
way to recovery.57  An unwinding of the previous credit expansion 
is usually a precondition of such a turn of events, but that 
process can take years.  Moreover, if pessimistic expectations are 
allowed to feed on themselves, then a contracting economy can 
spiral downward (in what Minsky called a “debt deflation”) for 
quite some time.58  If there is a road to full employment by way of 
market adjustments alone, Minsky wrote, “it may well go by way 
of hell.”59 
II.  THE REALITY OF INCESSANT INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION 
The political economy of Minsky was inspired by Keynes, but 
it was also influenced by Minsky’s association with Joseph A. 
 
 51 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 33. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Monthly Unemployment Rate from 1948 to 2011, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS1
4000000 (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (change output options “from” to 1948); BUDGET AND 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 29. 
 54 News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—
December 2010 (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
archives.empsit_01072001.pdf. 
 55 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 42, at 31. 
 56 Id. at 42. 
 57 MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 175–77. 
 58 Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, supra note 25, at 1. 
 59 MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 177. 
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Schumpeter, who supervised Minsky’s doctoral work until his 
untimely death in 1950.60 
While Keynes offered insight into cyclical fluctuations, 
Schumpeter provided Minsky with insight into structural 
economic evolution over a series of cycles.  That is because 
Schumpeter—who coined the phrase “creative destruction”—
placed the dynamic power of ceaseless structural economic 
change at the center of his economic analysis.61  In fact, Minsky 
underscored an aspect of Schumpeter’s concept of “creative 
destruction” that few others recognized: financial innovation.62  
“[N]owhere is evolution, change and Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurship more evident than in banking and finance and 
nowhere is the drive for profits more clearly the factor making for 
change,” wrote Minsky in an article produced in the last few 
years of his life, a period during which his writings gave 
increasing attention to Schumpeter’s ideas.63 
In the 1990s, Minsky still believed that the U.S. economy 
moved along a cyclical path, but he also believed that the system 
had recently entered a new stage of capitalist development as a 
consequence of constant institutional change.64  According to 
Minsky, the managerial era of American capitalism, which 
matured in the immediate aftermath of World War II, had given 
way in the 1980s to a stage characterized by emergence of money 
managers as the nation’s dominant economic decision-makers.65  
He called the new era money-manager capitalism (MMC).66 
At least four institutional features of MMC have emerged to 
play a role in explaining the economic difficulties of the past few 
years.  The origin of the recent global crisis can be traced in large 
part to the following financial-sector innovations: unconventional 
mortgages, securitization, the rise of hedge funds, and the 
globalization of finance.67 
At the heart of the recent financial crisis are home 
mortgages that deviate from the traditional U.S. home-loan 
 
 60 Minsky, in A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS, supra note 
8, at 353–54. 
 61 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 87–89 (4th ed. 
1952). 
 62 Hyman P. Minsky, Schumpeter and Finance, in MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 103, 106 (Salvatore Biasco, Alessandro Roncaglia, & Michele 
Salvati eds., 1993). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 111–13. 
 65 Id. at 109–13. 
 66 Id. at 111–12. 
 67 For a similar analysis, see generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra 
note 39. 
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arrangement, which involves a long-term loan on fixed-rate 
terms.68  Many of these unconventional—some writers call them 
“exotic”—mortgages have adjustable interest rates and/or 
payments that balloon over time.69  Federal law has allowed 
banks to issue adjustable-rate mortgages since 1982, but their 
use and complexity exploded starting in 2003.70  For example, 
industry experts estimate that a variant called the “option 
adjustable rate mortgage” (option ARM), which offers a low 
“teaser” rate and later resets so that minimum payments 
skyrocket, accounted for about 0.5% of all U.S. mortgages written 
in 2003, but close to thirteen percent  (and up to fifty-one percent 
in some U.S. communities) in 2006.71  More precise figures are 
unavailable because banks have not been required to report how 
many option ARMs they originate.72 
Many of these mortgages were created to target less 
creditworthy customers, including those in what the banking 
industry calls the subprime market.73  Others were marketed to 
people who wanted to speculate in the booming housing market, 
through buying and then quickly reselling property.74  However, 
many unconventional loans were marketed to ordinary working 
families who could have handled conventional mortgages.75 
Unfortunately, it was clear from the outset that many of 
these exotic mortgages could never be paid back.76  But why did 
this happen?  Why did the mortgage market evolve in this 
dangerous direction? 
This is where securitization comes into the picture.  
Securitization is simply the bundling of loans—which can include 
auto loans, student loans, accounts receivable, and of course, 
mortgages—and the subsequent selling of bundle shares to 
investors.77  In the mid-1980s, Minsky returned home from a 
conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
 
 68 Id. 
 69 Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 11, 2006, at 71–
72. 
 70 Id. at 72. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 39, at 7. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Bruce Marks, Op-Ed., Bailout Must Address the Foreclosure Crisis, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2008, at A17. 
 76 For an eye-opening look at the aggressive marketing of unconventional mortgages, 
see Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 26, 
2007, at BU1, 8. 
 77 Hyman P. Minsky, The Capital Development of the Economy and the Structure of 
Financial Institutions 22 (Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 72, 1992), 
available at http://www.levyinstitute.com/pubs/wp72.pdf. 
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and wrote that securitization was emerging as a key, new 
financial innovation: “That which can be securitized, will be 
securitized.”78  He was right, but way ahead of his time.  
Securitization of mortgages exploded onto the scene only in the 
past decade. 
After the dot-com bubble burst in 2001, housing in the 
United States looked like a safer and more attractive investment 
to many Americans, especially with low interest rates in place 
due to Federal Reserve policy.79  Still, returns on conventional 
mortgages were too mundane to satisfy the aims of most money 
managers.  As a result, what Minsky and Schumpeter might 
have called the “financial-innovation machine” turned its 
attention to housing and shifted into high gear. 
Securitization of mortgages meant that home loan 
originators could be less concerned about the creditworthiness of 
borrowers than in the past.80  Thus, they had an incentive to 
steer customers toward the most profitable types of mortgages, 
even if they were the riskiest (which, of course, they were).  The 
result was the explosive growth in option ARMs and in “no 
money down” and “no documentation” (of income) loans.81  
Minsky warned of all this in 1992, when he observed that 
securitization means mortgage originators are rewarded as long 
as they avoid “obvious fraud.”82 
Securitization worked like magic upon risky mortgages.  
Instead of “garbage in, garbage out,” risky loans went into the 
process, but out came bundles that received high credit ratings 
from agencies like Standard and Poors.83  According to 
Christopher Huhne, a member of the British Parliament and 
former rating-agency economist, part of the challenge of rating 
the bundles was “that financial markets fall in love with new 
things, with innovations, and the [important] thing about new 
things is that it is very difficult to assess the real riskiness of 
them because you don’t have a history by definition.”84 
 
 78 Hyman P. Minsky, Schumpeter: Finance and Evolution, in EVOLVING 
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1990). 
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 80 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 39, at 8. 
 81 Baker, supra note 79, at 74–76. 
 82 Minsky, The Capital Development of the Economy and the Structure of Financial 
Institutions, supra note 77, at 22–23. 
 83 Christoper Huhne, quoted on World Business Review (BBC World Service Sept. 1, 
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Another problem is that rating agencies did not verify the 
information provided by mortgage issuers.85  Instead, they based 
their decisions on information received from intermediaries that, 
as Minsky put it, “did not hazard any of their wealth on the 
longer term viability of the underlying [loans].”86 
Moreover, there are so many middlemen in the mortgage 
securitization game, including a number that have been 
permitted to operate in a largely unregulated manner, that no 
one person or organization could be easily assigned blame in the 
event of default.  The chain between the borrower and the 
investor includes realtors, home appraisers, mortgage brokers, 
mortgage originators, investment banks that bundled the 
mortgages, agencies that rated the bundles, and even companies 
(like American International Group) that “insured” many of the 
bundles.87 
Mortgage-backed securities totaling into the trillions of 
dollars were bundled and sold as shares to investors.  In late 
2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac alone held $4.1 trillion.88  
Moreover, the private market in “credit-default swaps” (CDS) 
reached $45 trillion by late 2007.89  The CDS were used by 
borrowers and lenders as a hedge against (mortgage-backed) 
securities losses, as a way to speculate that other companies will 
experience a loss, or as an arbitrage instrument (that is, they 
allowed purchasers to take advantage of price differences in the 
market).90 
Many of the mortgages underlying mortgage-backed 
securities are now in foreclosure or headed there.  In 2008, 2.3 
million U.S. homes went into foreclosure, up 81% from 2007 and 
 
 85 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, SUMMARY 
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225% from 2006.91  There were an additional 2.8 million filings in 
2009, and 2.9 million more in 2010.92 
Mortgage delinquencies have also risen to record levels as a 
result of the financial crisis and recession that followed.  In 
February 2009, for example, seven percent of U.S. homeowners 
with mortgages were at least thirty days late on their loans, an 
increase of more than fifty percent from a year earlier.93  Among 
subprime borrowers, that month’s delinquency rate was 39.8%.94  
According to the latest data available, the delinquency rate on 
residential properties was just over nine percent of all loans 
outstanding as of the end of the third quarter of 2010.95 
There has been much public discussion in the United States 
over the past few years about reckless homebuyers.  Some were, 
but mortgage seekers did not bring the economy to its knees on 
their own.  Trouble in the housing market would not have 
generated a crisis of the magnitude we have witnessed in the 
absence of the financial innovations described above.96  As 
Minsky stressed at a pair of professional conferences in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, there is a symbiotic relationship “between 
the growth of securitization and managed money.”97 
From a Minsky perspective, yet another part of the story of 
the recent crisis is the role of hedge funds and other investment 
funds—and of investment banks and other financial institutions.  
Although the following discussion focuses on hedge funds (which 
not only operated largely outside the realm of financial-system 
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regulation, but were relatively new to the scene prior to the 
crisis), investment banks and other institutions played a similar 
role.98 
Some of the biggest purchasers of securitized mortgages 
have been hedge funds.  The earliest of these funds were 
established in the first few decades after World War II for the 
purpose of seeking absolute returns (rather than beating a 
benchmark stock market index).99  They were indeed “hedged” 
funds, which sought to protect principal from financial loss by 
hedging investments through short selling (which involves 
betting that the price of an investment product will fall) or other 
means.100 
The number of hedge funds and the assets under their 
management expanded in the 1990s and grew even more rapidly 
in the 2000s.101  At the same time, these assets became 
increasingly concentrated at the top ten firms, and funds became 
more diverse in terms of the strategies their managers 
employed.102  In mid-2008, the Alternative Investment 
Management Association estimated that the world’s hedge funds 
(based primarily in the United States) were managing $2.5 
trillion, though it acknowledged that other estimates were as 
high as $4 trillion.103 
The total value of assets under hedge-fund management is 
uncertain because such funds are typically restricted to wealthy 
individuals and institutional investors, which exempts them from 
most financial-sector reporting requirements and regulation.104  
Taking advantage of their largely unregulated status, managers 
of hedge funds used mortgage-backed securities as collateral to 
take out highly leveraged loans.105  They then purchased an 
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separated commercial and investment banking for over a half century. See Cyrus Sanati, 
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assortment of financial instruments, including still more 
mortgage bundles.106  As a result, the world’s hedge funds used 
securitized mortgages to lay an inherently fragile foundation for 
a financial “house of cards.”107 
The recent crisis was unmistakably global.  It had economic 
and political ramifications on all continents.  Its ripple effect 
reached even unexpected places including rural China, which 
saw workers return home from that nation’s export-oriented 
cities when factories cut production.108 
The global nature of the recent situation would not have 
surprised Minsky, who stressed early on that money-manager 
capitalism “is international in both the funds and the assets in 
funds.”109  Looking ahead to the recent crisis, Minsky wrote: “The 
problem of finance that will emerge is whether the . . . 
institutions of national governments can contain both the 
consequences of global financial fragility and an international 
debt deflation.”110  He worried that the United States would be 
unable to serve as “the guardian angel for stability in the world 
economy” and stressed the need for “an international division of 
responsibility for maintaining global aggregate gross profits.”111 
In short, the global economy has recently experienced a 
classic Minsky crisis—one with intertwined cyclical and 
institutional (structural) dimensions.  Its origins were in a 
housing boom fueled by rising expectations, expanding debt, and 
financial innovation.  Then the bubble burst, creating first a 
credit crunch, then a broader banking and stock-market crisis, 
and, ultimately, a recession, the adverse effects of which continue 
to linger, especially in labor, housing and financial markets. 
Since 2007, the global banking industry has seen an 
unprecedented shakeout, but even in early 2011 there is 
uncertainty about how much more difficulty lies ahead.  There 
are concerns, for example, that some U.S. banks will be forced to 
buy back mortgage securities that may have failed to meet 
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certain underwriting standards.112  The uncertainty regarding 
institutional exposure to possible mortgage-related financial 
losses was a contributor to the credit crunch of 2007, and similar 
uncertainty exists today.113  In addition, a new threat has 
emerged in the form of uncertainty about the fiscal stability of 
entire nations, such as the recent concerns over Greece and 
Ireland.114 
III.  THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY 
The third dimension in the political economy of Minsky is 
the role of public policy.  Before writing about Keynes and 
studying with Schumpeter, Minsky was a student of Henry C. 
Simons at the University of Chicago.115  Simons’ influence left an 
indelible mark on Minsky’s approach to public policy. 
Simons is remembered today as a critic of Keynes (as was 
Schumpeter) and founder of the “Chicago School” brand of 
economics that generally favors a laissez-faire approach to 
economic policy.116  Nevertheless, his views were complex, and he 
had a nuanced position on the role of government, one shaped by 
a career that focused not only on that topic directly, but also on 
taxation, monetary policy, and other specific aspects of economic 
policy.117  Simons favored market decisions over collective action 
in circumstances where competition prevailed, but he also gave 
the public sector major responsibilities.118  These included 
providing the legal foundation for such competition and acting 
decisively—and, if need be, permanently—when such conditions 
could not prevail.119 
Simons’ notion that there is a “division of labor” between 
what can be left to the market and what needs to be done by the 
public sector manifests itself in Minsky’s overall conception of the 
role of government, which can be seen perhaps most clearly in his 
1986 book, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy.120  Simons’ 
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influence also appears in Minsky’s attention to specific policy 
elements, especially Minsky’s call for a “structure of industry 
policy” aimed at preventing institutions from becoming “too big to 
fail.”121  Against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis and 
recession, Minsky’s approach to public policy can be presented as 
generating an economic policy strategy aimed at recovery and 
reform. 
A. Recovery 
The overall aim of Minsky’s strategy for economic recovery is 
to prevent a recession from becoming another Great 
Depression.122  That strategy gives attention to both fiscal policy 
and monetary policy.  Each is considered in turn. 
The fiscal policy component of Minsky’s strategy centers on 
what he called Big Government.123  At the heart of Big 
Government is a federal budget that tends toward surpluses in 
inflationary periods and produces deficits large enough to 
stabilize aggregate profits in recessionary periods.124  Minsky 
envisioned that such countercyclical spending would be a “built-
in” feature of the budget structure, but he also recognized that 
discretionary legislative action (the recent American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act, for example) would be needed on 
occasion.125 
The monetary policy component of Minsky’s strategy centers 
on the stabilizing actions of the central bank.  He envisioned that 
the Federal Reserve (Fed) would intervene as “lender of last 
resort” in response to the threat of a serious credit crisis and 
economic contraction.126  “Central banks are the institutions that 
are responsible for containing and offsetting financial 
instability,” Minsky wrote in 1986.127  In that same year, he also 
contributed an article emphasizing the globalization of finance 
and calling for international central-bank coordination as a way 
to prepare for the next big financial crisis.128 
Much of what Minsky described in his recovery agenda has 
been pursued by U.S. policymakers during the recent 
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recession.129  While fiscal policy already contained automatic 
stabilizers, major legislative measures were taken to support 
aggregate demand in 2008, 2009, and again in 2010.130  Monetary 
policy has also been engaged in the stabilization effort. 
To stabilize the financial sector and overall economy in the 
wake of the recent financial crisis, the Fed aggressively cut 
interest rates, allowed financial institutions to borrow from it at 
nominal rates, and gave banks cash in exchange for risky assets 
(promising to take on the risk that those assets could prove 
worthless).131  The Fed, which students of Minsky sometimes call 
the “Big Bank,” has also engineered bank mergers and worked 
with other central banks to increase the supply of dollars 
worldwide.132  In many ways, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has 
pursued a strategy consistent with Minsky’s conception of a Big 
Bank that provides the monetary-policy complement to the fiscal 
policy of Big Government.133 
Legislation creating TARP in 2008 is also broadly consistent 
with Minsky’s conception of the central bank as lender of last 
resort.134  However, Minsky admired how the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation closed insolvent banks and assisted solvent 
ones during the Great Depression.135  Thus, it is likely he would 
have preferred a more hands-on approach to cleaning up bank 
balance sheets than that resulting from TARP. 
B. Reform 
Looking beyond policies designed to address an economic 
downturn, Minsky’s reform agenda included stricter regulation 
and supervision of the financial system.136  It also included a 
national commitment to full employment by means of public-
service employment for the jobless.137  The aim of both was to 
foster and sustain a period of prosperity as well as lay the 
foundation for more moderate future downturns.138 
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Minsky believed that those responsible for government 
regulation and supervision of the financial system are in a 
constant struggle with financial-market innovators.139  Any set of 
regulations can contain financial innovation for only so long; then 
an updated regulatory framework will be required—and the 
process begins again.  “After an initial interval, the basic 
disequilibrating tendencies of capitalist finance will once again 
push the financial structure to the brink of fragility,” he 
explained.140 
Still, Minsky believed it was necessary for the Fed and 
regulators to continue the struggle: “The evolution of financial 
practices must be guided to reduce the likelihood that fragile 
situations conducive to financial instability will develop.”141  This 
is where Dodd-Frank would fit into the Minsky framework. 
Minsky’s financial reform also involved broader corporate 
reform, which he sometimes called a structure-of-industry 
policy.142  This included placing size limits on corporations based 
on the level of assets and/or employment.143  These were seen as 
a way to foster greater competition, reduce the need for lender-of-
last-resort interventions, and avoid situations in which specific 
corporations would be seen as “too big to fail.”144 
Minsky’s reform agenda also included an employment policy 
that envisions government as “employer of last resort.”145  The 
idea was for public-service employment based roughly on the 
New Deal Era’s Works Progress Administration and Civilian 
Conservation Corps.146  This policy would provide able-bodied 
people with an alternative to joblessness and unemployment 
benefits; under such a policy, public-service payrolls would rise 
and fall to offset private-sector demand for workers.147  In 
Minsky’s view, the policy would help stabilize the economy, but it 
would also help foster a more humane economy.148 
CONCLUSION: STANDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF MINSKY 
With enactment of Dodd-Frank, financial regulation has 
entered a new era.  The political economy of Minsky can 
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accompany that era with a fresh approach to economics.  In place 
of the efficient-market hypothesis, Minsky offers a financial-
instability alternative.  That alternative is consistent with 
Keynes’ observation that business cycles are a characteristic 
feature of advanced capitalist economies.149  Minsky’s approach 
also incorporates Schumpeter’s recognition of incessant 
institutional innovation;150 indeed, recent innovations help 
explain the first serious financial crisis of the age of money-
manager capitalism.  In addition, Minsky’s approach earns the 
name “political” economy because, drawing inspiration from 
Simons, he envisioned an important division of labor between the 
market and the public sector, one that gives key responsibilities 
to government in the realm of economic management.151 
Minsky used to say we should stand on the shoulders of 
giants to better understand the economy.152  Just as he stood on 
the shoulders of Keynes, Schumpeter, and Simons, we can now 
stand on his shoulders—to not only better understand the recent 
financial crisis, the Great Recession, and the anemic U.S. 
recovery, but also to better anticipate what might lie ahead.  
From a Minsky perspective, explaining current events involves 
incorporating cyclical and structural dimensions.153  His 
perspective also involves devising a policy strategy that gives 
attention to both recovery and reform.154 
The recent attention to Minsky’s ideas, in the academy and 
in the practical world of financial decision-making, has enriched 
our understanding.  But Minsky has been “discovered” in the 
midst of other periods of financial turmoil (in October 1987, for 
example), only to fall back into obscurity once the economy has 
recovered.  We do ourselves a disservice when Minsky’s insights 
are reduced to an analysis of just a single event (a “Minsky 
moment”) or even of financial instability. 
Here is how that can be avoided.  Standing squarely on the 
shoulders of Minsky means recognizing the perennial value of 
evolutionary and institutionally focused thinking about the 
economy.  It also means giving serious attention not only to 
business cycles and financial innovation but also to Minsky’s 
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effort to guide the further development of the economic system in 
a more humane direction.155 
 
 155 For more on the path forward for economics, using analyses inspired by Minsky, 
see FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION 
(Charles J. Whalen ed.) (forthcoming 2011). 
